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NOTES
SERRANO V. PRIEST: THE END OF AN
ERA IN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING
The system of free public schools which Californians enjoy is
provided for in article IX, sections 5 and 6 of the state constitution.1
These sections provide for: (1) the establishment of a uniform sys-
tem of "common schools," (2) a minimum contribution per pupil in
average daily attendance (with an absolute minimum contribution of
$2,400 per school district regardless of its size) made by the state gov-
ernment to the local school districts, and (3) the levying of taxes by
local governing bodies at a rate necessary to meet their annual educa-
tion budget.
In order to implement the constitutional provisions, the state leg-
islature has established what is known in school financing parlance as
a "combination plan.' 2  This plan utilizes revenue from both the local
districts and the state.
1. In pertinent part these constitutional sections provide:
"Sec. 5. The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a
free school shall be kept up and supported in each district ...
"Sec. 6.
"The Legislature shall add to the State School Fund such other means from the
revenues of the State as shall provide in said fund for apportionment in each fiscal
year, an amount not less than one hundred and eighty dollars ($180) per pupil in
average daily attendance in the kindergarten schools, elementary schools, secondary
schools, and technical schools in the Public School System during the next preceding
fiscal year.
"The entire State School Fund shall be apportioned in each fiscal year in such
manner as the Legislature may provide, through the school districts and other agencies
maintaining such schools, for the support of, and aid to, [the aforementioned schools]
except that there shall be apportioned to each school district in each fiscal year not
less than one hundred and twenty dollars ($120) per pupil in average daily attendance
in the district during the next preceding fiscal year and except that the amount ap-
portioned to each school district in each fiscal year shall be not less than twenty-four
hundred dollars ($2,400).
'The Legislature shall provide for the levying annually by the governing body of
each county, and city and county, of such school district taxes, at rates not in excess
of the maximum rates of school district tax fixed or authorized by the Legislature, as
will produce in each fiscal year such revenue for each school district as the governing
board thereof shall determine is required in such fiscal year for the support of all
schools and functions of said district. .. ."
2. See notes 11-13 & accompanying text infra.
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The legislature, pursuant to article IX, section 6 of the state con-
stitution, requires local governing bodies to levy taxes on the real prop-
erty within a school district at a rate which will discharge the require-
ments of the district's annual education budget.3 The legislature has
established maximum allowable district tax rates ;4 however, these rate
ceilings may be exceeded if a majority of the voters in a given district
indorses the higher rate.5
In addition to these local property taxes, the California public
school system is funded by state sources of revenue supplied under the
so-called "foundation program. '  Under this program the state guar-
antees that each school district will receive, from either state or local
funds, at least $355 annually for each elementary school student7 and
$488 for each high school pupil. 8 The state's contributions under the
3. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 20701-06 (West 1969). Section 20701 provides as
follows: "After approving the budget of a school district, the county superintendent
of schools shall determine the amount of money which must be provided by a school
district tax." The method of determining the school district tax is spelled out in section
20702. "He [the county superintendent of schools] shall determine this amount by
deducting from the total estimated needs of the school district as shown by its budget
the total estimated income of the school district (from all sources other than a school
district) tax for the current school year as estimated in the budget. The remainder, if
any, shall be the minimum amount of the school district tax to be levied by the board
of supervisors for the particular school district."
4. Id. §§ 20751-52 (West Supp. 1971). Section 20751 provides in pertinent
part: "[T]he maximum rate of school district tax which may be levied for all school
purposes . . . for any school district in any school year on each one hundred dollars
($100) of assessed valuation within the district shall be as follows:
"[I]n any separate elementary school district, eighty cents ($0.80) for elemen-
tary school purposes ....
"[I]n any separate high school district, seventy-five cents ($0.75) for high school
purposes .... "
Section 20751 also allows for elementary and secondary school maxima of $1.25
and $0.85 respectively if the district's expenses of education in prior years were below
certain statutory minima.
5. Id. §§ 20803-04 (West 1969), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
6. Id. § 17300 (West 1969). The statement of legislative intent in section
17300 indicates the lawmakers' belief that "[t]he system of public school support
should assure that state, local, and other funds are adequate for the support of a
realistic foundation program." Thus, section 17300 provides as follows in its last
paragraph: "The broader based taxing power of the State should be utilized to raise
f.he level of financial support in the properly organized but financially weak districts
of the State. . . . It should also be used to provide a minimum amount of guaranteed
support to all districts ....
7. Id. §§ 17656, 17660 (West Supp. 1971). These sections also indicate that
the figure is $345 annually for each elementary school student in school districts
which have an average daily attendance of less than 901 during the fiscal year.
8. Id. § 17665. This section provides that the state superintendent of public
instruction in computing the foundation program for high school districts "shall mul-
[Vol. 23
SERRANO V. PRIEST
foundation program are classified as either "basic state aid" or "equali-
zation aid." The basic state aid is nothing more than a flat grant to
each district of $125 per pupil per year9 which is given to all districts
regardless of their individual financial status. The equalization aid for
a given school district, on the other hand, is computed by the state
superintendent of public instruction. First, the amount of local prop-
erty taxes which would be generated if the district were to assess a the-
oretical tax of one dollar on each $100 of assessed property valuation in
elementary school districts and eighty cents per $100 in high school dis-
tricts is computed. 10 To this computed district aid figure is added the
$125 per pupil basic state aid amount. The total of these two sums
is then compared with the foundation program figure for that district.
If the total is less than the minimum amount required under the foun-
dation program, the state provides the "equalization aid" necessary to
raise the district to the minimum level established under the foundation
program." The equalization aid monies are thus to insure that the less
fortunate districts will not be forced to operate below the basic financial
level set by the foundation program.' 2
tiply the average daily attendance by four hundred eighty-eight dollars ($488)." This
is the same basic method which is employed in computing the elementary school
foundations programs under section 17656 and 17660.
Section 17665 only applies to high school districts with an average daily at-
tendance of 301 or more. The computations involved in the foundation program for
smaller districts are set forth in section 17664 of the Education Code.
9. Id. § 17751 (West 1969) which provides that the superintendent of pub-
lic instruction must "allow one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) to each ele-
mentary school district for each unit of average daily attendance therein during the
fiscal year . . . but not less than two thousand four hundred dollars ($2,400) shall
be allowed to any elementary school district, to be known as basic state aid." Section
17801 of the Education Code contains similar provisions as to basic aid for high school
districts.
10. Id. § 17702. The specific language of the section is as follows: "The Su-
perintendent of Public Instruction shall compute for each district . . . the amount to
be known as district aid, which a tax levied on each one hundred dollars ($100) of
100 percent of the assessed valuation in such district . . . would produce if levied, if
such tax was:
"(a) One dollar ($1) in an elementary school district.
"(b) Eighty cents ($0.80) in a high school district."
11. Id. §§ 17901-02. Section 17901 states that: "The Superintendent of Public
Instruction shall compare the total of the amounts allowed to, and computed for,
each elementary district [under basic state aid and district aid] . . . with the amount of
the foundation program of school support. ...
"If the total amount allowed to, and computed for, any elementary school district
[under basic state aid and district aid], is less than the amount of the foundation pro-
gram . . . computed for such district . . . he shall add to the amount [of the basic
state aid and district aid] such additional amount, to be known as state equalization
aid, as may be necessary to equal that computed for such district [under the foundation
program]."
12. "Supplemental aid" is also available to especially poor districts which make
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This combination plan, which forms the basis for the California
public school financing scheme, may be summarized by the following
formula:
state aid = [guaranteed amount under the foundation program -
(local district aid + basic state aid flat grant)] + basic state aid
flat grant. 13
This illustration of the California system as a whole brings into
focus one of the inequities inherent in the program. The basic state
aid is of no value to the poorer districts because they would receive
the same amount of state funds through equalization aid even if there
were no basic aid program. The districts which are too wealthy to
qualify for equalization aid, however, still receive the basic aid. Thus,
the basic aid has the perverse effect of benefiting the richer districts
and being of little or no significance to the poorer districts.'I
This illogical result under the foundation program is not the
only problem inherent in the current California financing system; the
reliance on local property taxes for 55.7 percent of the revenues for the
California public school system' 5 produces even greater inequities.
This inequality results because there are wide variations among the
school districts in assessed property valuations. The value of taxable
real estate ranges from $103 per school child in the poorest district to
$952,156 per child in the wealthiest-a ratio of almost 1 to 10,000!1
Consequently, there are significant differences in the amount of money
available per pupil in the different school districts despite state contri-
butions under the foundation program. 7
Recently, the local property tax financing of California public
schools was declared unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court
an extra effort by taxing at a high rate. An elementary school district with an assessed
valuation of $12,500 or less per pupil may receive as much as $125 additional
revenue per pupil if the local tax rate is above a minimum statutory level. In the case
of a high school district with an assessed valuation which does not exceed $24,500 per
pupil, the supplemental aid may reach $72 per child if the local tax is high enough.
Id. §§ 17920-26 (West Supp. 1971) for the details of the supplemental aid program.
13. Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Consti-
tutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REy. 305, 315 (1969).
14. Id.
15. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINAN CE Pt. I, at 5 (1971) [herein-
after cited as LEGISLATIVE ANALYST].
16. Id., pt. V, at 7 (1970).
17. Statistics compiled by the legislative analyst show the following range of per
pupil expenditures for the 1969-1970 school year:
Elementary High School Unified
Low $ 407 $ 722 $ 612
Median 672 898 766
High 2,586 1,767 2,414
Id., pt. V, at 8.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
in Serrano v. Priest.18 The court held that the property tax system of
financing makes "the quality of a child's education a function of the
wealth of his parents and neighbors,"' 9 and that this violated the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.20
Although similar financing systems in other states have been chal-
lenged on the same constitutional grounds,2' Serrano is the first appel-
late court decision to strike down the property tax financing of public
schools. 22 The ruling, if left undisturbed in subsequent proceedings, 3
could lead to an unprecedented overhaul of state and local taxing and
spending methods throughout the country.2 4 This note will assess the
content of the decision, its value as a precedent, and its implications for
the future.
18. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, rehearing denied Sept. 22,
1971, modified, 5 Cal. 3d 884a, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1971).
19. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
20. Id.
21. E.g., Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 948 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Burruss v. Wilker-
son, 310 F. Supp. 572-73 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970); Rodriguez
v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 40 U.S.L.W. 476 (W.D. Tex., Dec. 23, 1971);
McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). All involved equal protection attacks on
school financing systems based on property tax revenues.
22. In Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), a statute roughly similar
to those involved in Serrano was held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court indicated that the pleadings and affidavit of-
fered by plaintiffs were inadequate as a basis for deciding the equal protection claim.
23. See text accompanying notes 119-22 infra.
24. The wide spread reliance on local revenue for public schools is indicated in
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, DIGEST Op EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 54
(1970). That report notes that 52.3% of the total revenue receipts of public ele-
mentary and secondary schools in 1967-1968 came from local sources. It also indicates
that the school systems of all states rely on local revenue sources, ranging from a high
of 85% of total revenues in Nebraska to a low of 4.9% in Hawaii. In thirty of the
states the figure is over 50%.
The nationwide impact of Serrano is further illustrated by the fact that it has
already been followed in the recent federal district court cases of Van Dusartz v.
Hatfield, 40 U.S.L.W. 2228 (D. Minn., Oct. 12, 1971), and Rodriquez v. San Antonio
Independent School District, 40 U.S.L.W. 476 (W.D. Tex., Dec. 23, 1971). Both cases
held that a property tax system of public school financing which made per pupil spend-
ing a function of the school districts wealth violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, in Spano v. Board of Education, 40 U.S.L.W.
2475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Jan. 21, 1972), the court explicitly rejected a similar attack
against the New York public school financing system.
The court in Van Dusartz cited Serrano and relied upon the reasoning of the
California court to a large extent.
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-Setting the Stage For Serrano-
Action of the Lower Court
On August 23, 1968, a number of elementary and high school
children attending public schools in Los Angeles County commenced a
class action seeking ultimately to revamp the state school financing
scheme so as to secure equality of educational opportunity.' 5 In a sec-
ond cause of action, a number of parents brought a similar suit as tax-
payers.26 Named as defendants were the state and local officials who
were assigned the responsibility for supplying the revenue for the sup-
port of public schools.'"
The plaintiffs alleged that the existing California system28 of fi-
nancing public schools violated both the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and certain provisions of the California
Constitution.29 Plaintiffs asserted that there were wide differences
among the school districts in the amount of money spent per pupil
under the existing system, which resulted in disparate educational
opportunities for the children. 30  The specific relief sought by the
plaintiffs was threefold: (1) a declaration that the financing sys-
tem for California public schools violated the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the "fundamental law and Constitu-
tion of California"; (2) an order directing the defendants to reorganize
the financing plan so as not to violate the constitutions of California
and the United States; and (3) a ruling that the court would retain juris-
diction of the case in order to revise the system should the defendants
and the legislature fail to do so within a reasonable time.31
The defendants filed general demurrers" which were sustained.
After plaintiffs failed to amend their complaint within the time per-
mitted, defendants moved for dismissal. The court granted the mo-
tion and dismissed the action.
In the subsequent appeal to the California court of appeal,33 the
25. Brief for Plaintiff at 2-16, Serrano v. Priest, Super. Ct. No. 938254 (L.A.
County, dismissed Mar. 17, 1969).
26. Id. at 15-18.
27. Id. at 8-9. The parties named were: Ivy Baker Priest, state treasurer; Max
Rafferty, state superintendent of public instruction; Houston I. Flournoy, state con-
troller; Harold J. Ostly, tax collector and treasurer of the County of Los Angeles; and
Richard M. Clowes, superintendent of schools of the County of Los Angeles.
28. See notes 1-13 & accompanying text supra.
29. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, §§ 11, 12; art. 9, § 5.
30. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 25, at 11.
31. Id. at 16-17.
32. Serrano v. Priest, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345, 347 (Ct. App. 1970), vacated by
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
33. Id.
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plaintiffs contended that the complaint stated a cause of action under
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
of appeal disagreed, however, and affirmed the order of dismissal.
In upholding dismissal by the lower court, the court of appeal re-
lied heavily upon Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 4 a case decided by a federal dis-
trict court in Illinois and affirmed in a memorandum opinion by the
United States Supreme Court. The court of appeal held that, as a sum-
mary affirmance by the Court, Mclnnis had precedential value and was
possibly binding on the California courts, and at a minimum was persua-
sive and entitled to great weight.35
Mclnnis involved a complaint by high school and elementary school
students in which it was alleged that certain Illinois statutes violated
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection because of wide vari-
ations in expenditures per student by the various school districts.3 6
These wide variations resulted primarily from a school financing sys-
tem (which was comparable to the one used in California) whereby
three fourths of the revenue for the Illinois public schools was generated
by local property taxes.3 7 In the opinion of the plaintiffs the Four-
teenth Amendment required a financing system which apportioned pub-
lic funds according to the educational needs of the students and not ac-
cording to the wealth of the district as a whole.3 8  The court held,
however, that public school spending based upon pupils' educational
needs is not a constitutionally created requirement.3 9 In addition, the
court was of the opinion that the constitution did not "establish the
rigid guideline of equal dollar expenditures for each student."40
It is important to note that the district court in Mclnnis reviewed
the Illinois statutes by a standard which presumed the validity of ac-
tions by the state legislature. The standard employed was similar to
that which the United States Supreme Court has used to test legislative
classifications in the area of economic regulation.41  This approach is
typified by such inquiries as: "What constitutionally permissible ob-
jective might this statute and other relevant materials plausibly be con-
strued to reflect?" 42  In other words, a court using this test would in-
34. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 322 (1969).
35. 89 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
36. 293 F. Supp. at 328-29.
37. Id. at 330.
38. Id. at 331.
39. Id. at 336.
40. Id.
41. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 491 (1955);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-3 8 (1934).
42. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1078
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Equal Protection].
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validate a statute only if the legislative classification failed to bear a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose. This "reasonable
relationship" test is in stark contrast to a more rigorous standard of re-
view 43-the "strict scrutiny" test. Under this test, if the court finds
that "suspect classifications" or "fundamental interests" are involved,
there is no longer a presumption in favor of validity and the legislation
in question is subjected to active and critical review.4" In order to
uphold the validity of a statute under this test, the state must demon-
strate that there is a compelling state interest in retaining such legisla-
tion.4 5
With these standards in mind, the Serrano plaintiffs argued in the
California Court of Appeal that McInnis was not persuasive, because
the district court erroneously used the "reasonable relationship" test in
upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois public school financing
scheme.4 6 The plaintiffs contended that the court of appeal should ap-
ply the more exacting "active review" or "strict scrutiny" test. This
was necessary, the plaintiffs argued, because a "fundamental right" was
at issue-namely, the right to an education. The court was not con-
vinced, however, and refused to apply the "strict scrutiny" test urged
by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs also contended, at this stage of the litigation, that
the McInnis holding was not binding precedent on the California court
because a summary affirmance by the United States Supreme Court is
not a decision on the merits.4" This was a vital argument by the plain-
tiffs because of the well established California rule that a decision by
the United States Supreme Court on a federal constitutional question
is binding upon state courts.4 8  The court of appeal disagreed with
plaintiffs' contentions as to the effect of a summary affirmance by the
Supreme Court and ruled that such an affirmance "is a decision on the
merits which has precedential value."' 49  Furthermore, the court of ap-
peal found the substantive arguments in McInnis convincing irrespec-
tive of the procedural effect of the holding on California courts.
The plaintiffs also argued that their complaint stated a cause of
action under article IX, section 5, of the California Constitution which
requires that:
43. Id. at 1087-1132.
44. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966),
quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
45. Developments-Equal Protection, supra note 42, at 1087-1132.
46. 89 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
47. Id. at 349-50.
48. Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1963); People v. Bradley, 1
Cal. 3d 80, 86, 460 P.2d 129, 132, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 (1969).
49. 89 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50.
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The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by
which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district
at least six months in every year, after the first year in which a
school has been established.
The plaintiffs contended that the California public school financing
methods violated this provision for a common school system because
it created "separate and distinct school systems, each providing an ed-
ucational program whose quality depends upon the relative wealth of
the residents of the district." 50  The court of appeal, notwithstanding
plaintiffs' ingenious argument, viewed the constitutional provision as
requiring only uniformity of curriculum and "educational progression"
not uniformity of expenditure per pupil.5 1
The court of appeal held that the numerous factual allegations of
the complaint did not state a cause of action under either the federal
or California constitutions.2 Thus, the judgment of dismissal was af-
firmed, and the stage was set for plaintiffs' subsequent appeal to the
California Supreme Court.
Decision of the California Supreme Court
On appeal to the California Supreme Court,53 the plaintiffs found
an audience much more receptive to their equal protection arguments.
Justice Sullivan, writing for the majority, clearly and forcefully stated that
if plaintiffs' factual allegations were true, the California public school
financing system violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.""
In a prefatory discussion, the court set out in detail the statutory
foundation of the state public school financing plan55 and compared
the plan with statistical data which showed substantial disparities in per
pupil expenditures by the various school districts. 6 Within this frame-
work, the court considered the plaintiffs' claim that the system violated
50. Id. at 350.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 351. Here the court employed the standard presumption that the
allegations of a complaint are considered to be true as against a demurrer.
53. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
54. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
55. Id. at 591-95, 487 P.2d at 1245-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605-608.
56. Id. The statistics compiled by the legislative analyst showing the range of
per pupil expenditures were referred to. See note 17 supra. In addition, the strikingly
parallel range of assessed valuations per pupil for the 1969-1970 school year was
noted:
Elementary High School
Low $ 103 $ 11,959
Median 19,600 41,300
High 952,156 349,093
Supra note 15, pt. V, at 7.
article IX, section 5, of the California Constitution. The court held that
a cause of action had not been stated under article IX, section 5, and
agreed with the court of appeal that section 5 could not reasonably be
interpreted to apply to school financing. 57
Having disposed of these preliminary matters, Justice Sullivan fo-
cused his main effort on the plaintiffs' equal protection arguments.
The different standards of review employed by the United States Su-
preme Court in equal protection cases were summarized. 8 There
was no discussion as to whether or not the statutory system being chal-
lenged was a denial of equal protection under the "rational relationship"
test. Instead, the "strict scrutiny" test was almost perfunctorily applied
to the statutory financing system for the California public schools.5 9
Wealth as a Suspect Classification
The plaintiffs' allegations that the school financing system estab-
lished classifications on the basis of wealth were found by the court
to be "irrefutable." 60 The court's conclusion was based upon the fact
that, aside from the monies provided by the state to raise all districts
to a minimum financial level,61 the underlying property wealth of a
school district largely determined the amount of money spent on educa-
tion. 62  Although the court acknowledged that the amount of money
available for education was partially a function of the rate at which
residents were willing to be taxed, the fact remained that a rich district
could tax itself at a lower rate and produce substantially more revenue
than a poorer district which taxed itself at a much higher rate. 6 3
The defendants argued that the California school financing system
did not discriminate on the basis of wealth since basic aid was distrib-
uted to pupils in all districts and equalization aid was aimed at elimi-
57. 5 Cal. 3d at 595-96, 487 P.2d at 1248-49, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608-609.
58. Id. at 597, 487 P.2d at 1249-50, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10.
59. Id. at 597-615, 487 P.2d at 610-23, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 1250-63.
60. Id. at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
61. This program is provided for in CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17702, 17751, 17801,
17901-07, 17920-26 (West Supp. 1971).
62. 5 Cal. 3d at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610. See text accom-
panying note 1 supra.
63. Id. at 597-98, 487 P.2d at 1251-52, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12. The court
illustrated its point with some examples taken from the LEGISLATIVE ANALYST. It
was noted that the Beverly Hills Unified School District, with an assessed valuation of
$50,885 per average daily attendance, need only tax itself at a rate of $2.38 per $100
of assessed valuation in order to produce an expenditure of $1,232 per average daily
attendance; while another Los Angeles County school district, Baldwin Park Unified,
with an assessed valuation of $3,706 per average daily attendance, must tax itself at a
$5.48 rate in order to produce an educational outlay of $577 per average daily attend-
ance. Id. at 600 n.15, 487 P.2d at 1252 n.15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611 n.15.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
nating the financial disparities among the districts.64 The court's re-
ply to this contention was simply that state funds only provide a por-
tion of school revenues 5 and that "the system as a whole generates
school revenue in proportion to the wealth of the individual district. ' 66
Justice Sullivan was equally unimpressed with defendants' conten-
tion that assessed valuation per pupil was not an accurate measure of
the wealth of a district, inasmuch as a district which had a low total
assessed valuation but also a small number of students would have a
high per pupil tax base.67 Justice Sullivan stated that defendants' argu-
ment was without merit:
The only meaningful measure of a district's wealth in the present
context is not the absolute value of its property, but the ratio of its
resources to pupils, because it is the latter figure which determines
how much the district can devote to educating each of its stu-
dents.""
The court also rejected the suggestion by the defendants that the
wealth of a school district does not necessarily reflect the wealth of the
families who live there. Justice Sullivan pointed out that plaintiffs'
factual allegations that there was "a correlation between a district's per
pupil assessed valuation and the wealth of its residents" must be ad-
mitted as true on demurrer.69
More fundamentally, Justice Sullivan attacked the notion that
wealth was not a "suspect classification" when the classification was
between districts rather than individuals:
We think that discrimination on the basis of district wealth is
equally invalid. The commercial and industrial property which
augments a district's tax base is distributed unevenly throughout
the state. To allot more educational dollars to the children of one
district than to those of another merely because of the fortuitous
presence of such property is to make the quality of a child's edu-
cation dependent upon the location of private commercial and
industrial establishments. 70
The court also rejected defendants' argument that plaintiffs had
not alleged any purposeful or intentional discrimination, and that there-
fore the complaint did not state a cause of action on constitutional
grounds. 71 The defendants contended that without purposeful discrim-
ination, any inequities in the school system would only be de facto, not
64. Id. at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
65. See notes 13-17 & accompanying text supra.
66. 5 Cal. 3d at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250-51, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11.
67. Id. at 599, 487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 600-601, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
70. Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13.
71. Id.
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de jure. Since the United States Supreme Court had not held de facto
racial discrimination unconstitutional, the defendants argued any de
facto discrimination on the basis of wealth should likewise be accorded
a presumption of validity.
To counter this argument, Justice Sullivan first reviewed a num-
ber of United States Supreme Court decisions which invalidated wealth
classifications that were "unintentional classifications [but] whose im-
pact simply fell more heavily on the poor. ' 72  Secondly, he pointed out
that, far from being an example of de facto discrimination, the Serrano
situation was noteworthy because of the extent to which state action
was the cause of the wealth classifications.7 3  Finally, he observed that
the school financing system could hardly be justified by an analogy to
de facto racial segregation, in view of the fact that the California Su-
preme Court had struck down such de facto segregation several years
before. 74  The court firmly concluded that "the school financing system
discriminates on the basis of the wealth of a district and its resi-
dents,' '7 5 and that this "suspect" legislative classification required "strict
scrutiny" by the court.7"
Education as a Fundamental Interest
Reinforcing its "suspect criteria" attack on the school financing
system, the court further concluded that the right to an education is a
"fundamental interest. ' 77  In equal protection terms, the court was in-
dicating that a further justification for an active and critical review of
the financing system lay in the fact that it had a strong impact on a
right deserving of special judicial consideration.
72. Id. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
73. 5 Cal. 3d at 603, 487 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 614. The opinion
cited the effect of zoning ordinances on the distribution of assessed valuation around
the state and the fact that "[glovernmental action drew -the school district boundary
lines, thus determining how much local wealth each district would contain."
74. Id. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The opinion referred to
Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr.
606 (1963).
75. 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
76. See note 72 supra.
77. 5 Cal. 3d at 604-10, 487 P.2d at 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-19.
78. The effect of the combination of the "suspect criteria" and "fundamental
interest" factors in an equal protection context has been summarized as follows: "The
interaction of these two factors can be visualized by imagining two gradients. Along
the first of these gradients is a hierarchy of classifications, with those which are most
invidious-suspect classifications based on traits such as race-at the top. Along the
second, arranged in ascending order of importance, are interests such as employment,
education, and voting. When the classification drawn lies at the top of the first
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The court acknowledged that it was taking an innovative turn in
that no direct authority supported its claim that education was a funda-
mental right.79 The court also candidly noted that earlier wealth classi-
fications had been struck down only when coupled with a select few
fundamental interests, such as rights of defendants in criminal"° cases
and voting rights."' However, the court was apparently of the view
that the question of whether an interest is "fundamental" is essentially
a matter to be determined by the court.8 2  Consequently, the court went
to considerable lengths to demonstrate "the indispensable role which
education plays in the modem industrial state. 83
Justice Sullivan's opinion emphasized the unique role of educa-
tion in molding a child's development as a citizen.8 4 Also noted was
the view that education in a modem society is a vital factor in determin-
ing a child's future chances for economic success. This latter point is
particularly interesting because it dovetailed nicely with the court's hold-
ing that the public school financing system classified on the basis of
wealth. Thus, the wealth classification was especially invidious be-
cause it deprived the poor child of the very means he must employ in
order to break the vicious cycle of poverty.
The Serrano opinion also referred to prior judicial expressions of
the importance of education in our society's scale of values.8 5 Brown
v. Board of Education,"8 the case which found de jure racial segregation
in public schools unconstitutional, was cited by the court as "the classic
expression" of the need for education. The court also highlighted some
of its own decisions which underlined the importance of education. 7
gradient, it will be subject to strict review even when the interest it affects ranks low on
the second gradient-for example, the denial of a driver's license on the basis of race.
As the nature of the classification becomes less invidious (descending on the first
gradient) the measure will continue to elicit strict review only as it affects interests
progressively more important (ascending on the second gradient)." Developments-
Equal Protection, supra note 42, at 1120-21.
79. 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
80. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
81. E.g., Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
82. Archibald Cox has expressed the view that "the relative importance of the
subject with respect to which equality is sought" is at least one "subjective" factor
which has motivated the Supreme Court in its modem equal protection decisions.
Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HAnv. L. REv. 91, 95 (1966).
83. 5 Cal. 3d at 605-607, 487 P.2d at 1255-57, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-17.
84. Id. at 605, 487 P.2d at 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
85. Id. at 606-07, 487 P.2d at 1256-57, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17.
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87. The following cases were discussed by the court: San Francisco Unified
School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d 669, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1971);
Manjares v. Newton, 64 Cal. 2d 365, 411 P.2d 901, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966); Jackson
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These cases were not cited as legally binding precedents by the court,
but rather as examples of judicial writing which were "persuasive in
their accurate factual description of the significance of learning.9 88
The Serrano court also sought to compare the right to an educa-
tion, in terms of its importance, with the rights of defendants in crimi-
nal cases and the right to vote,89 since these rights have already been
recognized by the Supreme Court as "fundamental interests" which,
when threatened by a statutory provision using wealth as a "suspect
criterion," have been deemed worthy of special consideration." Fi-
nally, in terms of the overall impact on the quality and direction of the
lives of Americans, the court found education to be at least as signifi-
cant as the other established "fundamental interests." 91
The Absence of a Compelling State Interest
The defendants' principal contention was that the existing statu-
tory school financing system served to "strengthen and encourage lo-
cal responsibility for control of public education. '9 2  In the defend-
ants' view, the goal of the statutes was to give local districts a voice in
the operation of their schools and a right to allocate local funds accord-
ing to the importance placed upon education by the voters.93 These ar-
guments were deemed not persuasive by the court, however, and the
court noted that the state could easily reform the financial system and
still allow the districts decision making power on such essential items
as personnel and curriculum.94 Moreover, the court stated that finan-
cial control by local residents "is a cruel illusion for poor school dis-
tricts" in view of the fact that "the poor district cannot freely choose to
tax itself into an [educational] excellence which its tax rolls cannot pro-
vide."95
In a broader context, the court's line of reasoning at this point rep-
resented the "strict scrutiny" approach which requires a high degree
of relevance to purpose before upholding the validity of a statute.98
Under this method of statutory interpretation, the normal presumption
of constitutional validity97 is eliminated and the burden of justifying
v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963);
Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 226 P. 926 (1924).
88. 5 Cal. 3d at 605, 487 P.2d at 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
89. Id. at 607-608, 487 P.2d at 1257-58, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18.
90. See notes 80 & 81 supra.
91. 5 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
92. Id. at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
96. Developments-Equal Protection, supra note 42, at 1101.
97. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
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the statute falls on the state.98 In Serrano, therefore, because the de-
fendants failed to establish that there were no "financially and adminis-
tratively feasible ' 99 alternatives to the old form of "local control," the
court could perceive no reason for perpetuating the old financial system
in the name of grass-roots democracy.
Territorial Uniformity as a
Constitutional Requirement
Defendants' contention that territorial uniformity is not a consti-
tutional requirement with respect to the school financing system was
also rejected by Justice Sullivan. Such an argument, he said, over-
looked recent United States Supreme Court decisions which enunciated
the following constitutional precepts:
[Wihere fundamental rights or suspect classifications are at stake,
a state's general freedom to discriminate on a geographical basis
will be significantly curtailed by the equal protection clause. 100
To buttress his point Justice Sullivan referred to cases in which the
Supreme Court had struck down attempts to shut down schools in one
part of a state while schools in other districts remained open.1'0 Ad-
ditionally, he noted the line of Supreme Court decisions concerned with
legislative apportionment to achieve equal representation of voters. 02
This latter group of cases was offered as further proof that, as the court
98. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
99. Developments-Equal Protection, supra note 42, at 1102.
100. 5 Cal. 3d at 612, 487 P.2d at 1261, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
101. Id. Justice Sullivan mentioned Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
In that case the Supreme Court declared: "A state, of course, has a wide discretion in
deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or shall operate only in certain coun-
ties .... But the record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Edward's
public schools were closed . . .for one reason . . . only: to ensure . . .that white
and colored children in Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go
to the same school." Id. at 231. In addition, Justice Sullivan noted Hall v. St.
Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), affd mem., 368 U.S.
515 (1962) which held that a statute allowing a district to close its schools in order
to avoid integration was unconstitutional, not only because it furthered racial dis-
crimination: "More generally, the Act is assailable because its application to one par-
ish, while the state provides public schools elsewhere, would unfairly discriminate
against the residents of that parish, irrespective of race .... " d. at 651.
102. 5 Cal. 3d at 613, 487 P.2d at 1261-62, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 621-22. Justice
Sullivan quoted the following excerpt from Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)
in which the Court rejected efforts to explain unequal representation on the basis
of geographic factors: "Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence
impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as
invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race. . . ." 5 Cal. 3d at 613,
487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622. From the Reynolds holding Justice Sulli-
van concluded that "[i]f a voter's address may not determine the weight to which his
ballot is entitled, surely it should not determine the quality of his child's ednseation," Id,
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put it, "[A]ccidents of geography and arbitrary lines of local govern-
ment can afford no grounds for discrimination among a state's citi-
zens."
103
Differentiating Education from Other
Essential Municipal Services
A more significant argument advanced by the defendants was
that the inclusion of education in the "fundamental interest" category
meant that the same approach might have to be taken with respect to
all property tax supported municipal services. 10 In other words, the
equal protection clause could also be construed as forbidding statutory
schemes which conditioned the quality or quantity of such vital serv-
ices as police and fire protection on the assessed valuation of local real
property. The court did not clearly express an opinion on this point.
Instead, Justice Sullivan indicated that the court was satisfied that the
unique importance of education has been "clearly demonstrated," not-
withstanding the possibility that the right to other municipal services
might also be considered "fundamental interests."'0 5
Thus, the court concluded that the "strict scrutiny" test was ap-
plicable to the school financing system and that the system as it was
currently organized was not necessary to the realization of any compel-
ling state interest. Consequently, the inescapable conclusion was that
California's statutory school financing system denied the plaintiffs equal
protection of the laws and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 6
The Effect of McInnis v. Shapiro
The California Supreme Court took a decidedly different view of
the precedential effect of the McInnis decision than had the court of
appeal. The high court of California felt strongly that McInnis was not
controlling upon the issues.. 0 7
The Serrano court pointed out that McInnis reached the Supreme
Court on appeal from a three judge federal court, a situation in which
the high court's jurisdiction was not discretionary.' 01 In addition, the
Serrano court noted that the Supreme Court had only summarily affirmed
the trial court's decision in McInnis, and this clouded the precedential
authority of the case because "the significance of such summary dis-
positions is often unclear, especially where, as in McInnis, the court
103. 5 Cal. 3d at 613, 487 P.2d at 1261, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
104. Id. at 613-14, 487 P.2d at 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622-23.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 614-15, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
107. Id. at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
108. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1971).
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cites no cases as authority and guidance." 10 9  Although the Supreme
Court's decision in McInnis was formally a decision on the merits,110
the court noted that some scholars were inclined to equate such sum-
mary decisions with denials of certiorari. 1
In any event, the majority in Serrano concluded that there were
also important substantive differences between Mclnnis and the Cali-
fornia litigation. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs in Mclnnis
had argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required that public school
expenditures be made on the basis of pupils' "educational needs. 1" 2
The district court in Mclnnis held that the "educational needs" concept
was too nebulous, and that there were "no 'discoverable and manage-
able standards' by which a court can determine when the Constitution
is satisfied and when it is violated.' 8 The Serrano situation was "sig-
nificantly different," in the opinion of the California Supreme Court,
because the plaintiffs had avoided the vague "educational needs" argu-
ment and had limited their complaint to "a familiar standard"-namely,
that "discrimination on the basis of wealth is an inherently suspect clas-
sification which may be justified only on the basis of a compelling state
interest.""' 4  Furthermore, the Serrano court felt that the nonjusticia-
bility of the "educational needs" standard was the fundamental rea-
son for the Mclnnis holding. Thus, the court reasoned, the district
court's treatment of the substantive constitutional issues was dictum.1 5
The Court's Conclusions
The court applied the customary rule and treated the demurrer
as admitting all material facts properly pleaded." 6 The facts pleaded
by the plaintiffs, together with the official statistical reports which had
been judicially noticed, convinced the court that a cause of action
had been stated by the plaintiffs:
[P]laintiff children have alleged facts showing that the public
school financing system denies them equal protection of the laws
because it produces substantial disparities among school districts
in the amount of revenue available for education." l7
109. 5 Cal. 3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
110. Id. The court conceded that "a summary affirmance is formally a decision
on the merits."
111. The court relied upon the following authorities: Currie, The Three-Judge
District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 74 n.365 (1964);
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929,
44 HARv. L. REv. 1, 14 (1930).
112. 5 Cal. 3d at 617, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
113. 293 F. Supp. at 335.
114. 5 Cal. 3d at 617, 487 P.2d at 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 617-18, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
117. Id. at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
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The same was true, said the court, with respect to the second cause of
action of the plaintiff parents. 118 Consequently, the court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeal, remanded the case to the trial court,
and ordered that the demurrers be overruled.
The ultimate outcome of the Serrano case is still somewhat prob-
lematical. Although the defendants' petition for rehearing has been
denied, 119 they still have the option of filing a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court. 2 ° Should certiorari be denied, or should
the court grant certiorari and affirm the decision of the California Su-
preme Court, the plaintiffs might still conceivably fail to sustain their
burden of proof in a trial on the merits.
Meanwhile, the State of California appears to have been left with
an unconstitutional method of financing its public school system. In
order to forestall any possible confusion during the period before the
constitutional issue is ultimately resolved, the California Supreme Court
has recently filed a modification order to its original decision in Ser-
rano.1
2 1
In its modification order the court made it clear that the existing
system of public school financing is still valid, and it was emphasized
that the original holding was not a final judgment on the merits inas-
much as the case had been remanded to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings. Furthermore, in the modification order the court stated that
if the trial court subsequently found the present system to be unconsti-
tutional, an orderly transition to a constitutional system was to be in-
sured by keeping the old system operable until a new system could be
put into effect.
In the following paragraphs, a critical look will be taken beyond
this uncertain state of affairs to see how well the decision in Serrano will
withstand the test of subsequent judicial scrutiny, whether by the Su-
preme Court if the case is appealed, or in separate litigation wherein
the case may be relied upon as a precedent.' 22
Problems and Uncertainties
in the Court's Decision
The constitutional issue dealt with in Serrano has been litigated
previously.' 23  In addition, there has been a significant amount of
118. Id.
119. See note 18 supra.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1971).
121. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, rehearing denied Sept. 22,
1971, modified, 5 Cal. 3d 884a, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1971).
122. See cases cited in note 24 supra.
123. See note 21 & accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 23
scholarly writing about the constitutionality of school financing systems
like the one challenged in Serrano.' Therefore, in gauging the effec-
tiveness of the Serrano decision, it is helpful to see how well the court
has responded to the earlier criticisms that have been directed against
this particular point of view. In order to gain a proper perspective, it
will be necessary to backtrack somewhat and juxtapose some of the
points made in the Serrano opinion with the criticisms that have been
raised against them.
Is Mclnnis Controlling?
The Matter of Summary Affirmance
The disagreement between the court of appeal and the California
Supreme Court as to the precedential effect of McInnis on the Serrano
case has already been noted.125 Although this is admittedly a technical
and procedural problem, the correct categorization of the effect of the
Mctnnis decision is an issue which could obviously have a very prac-
tical effect on any subsequent litigation in the Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court in Serrano did not dispute the gen-
eral proposition that a decision by the United States Supreme Court on
a federal constitutional question is binding upon the state courts; 2 6
nor did the Serrano court deny that a summary affirmance by the Su-
preme Court is a decision on the merits.'2 7  However, the California
Supreme Court did not agree with the court of appeal that this neces-
sarily leads to the direct and simple conclusion that Mclnnis is bind-
ing. Instead, the court noted that "the significance of such summary
dispositions is often unclear."'28  The court also indicated that some
writers have characterized a summary affirmance as being the rough
equivalent of a denial of certiorari, due to the court's heavy case
load and differences of opinion among the judges.'12
The Serrano opinion appears to be purposely vague at this point.
No case, statute, or court rule is cited which suggests that a summary
affirmance should be treated as anything but what it is: a decision on
the merits. In short, the court is using a makeweight argument that
obscures more than it clarifies.
124. E.g., Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable
Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305 (1969);
Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence
Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 583 (1968).
125. See text accompanying notes 107-15 supra.
126. See Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); People v. Bradley,
1 Cal. 3d 80, 86, 460 P.2d 129, 132, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 (1969).
127. See 5 Cal. 3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624; accord, R.
STEmN & E. GRESSmAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICi 193-230 (4th ed. 1969).
128. 5 Cal. 3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
129. Id. See note 111 supra.
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A subsidiary problem with the court's analysis at this point is that
no method is suggested whereby a lower court can look behind a sum-
mary affirmance by the Supreme Court and confidently determine what
really motivated the ruling. The suggestion has been made that a sum-
mary affirmance sometimes means the court believes that the issue
raised "is palpably frivolous or one lacking in substantiality because
controlled on the merits by settled doctrine."13  This explanation
would, of course, not support the Serrano court's categorization of
McInnis, or the conclusion that the summary affirmance was to be
treated as a species of denial of certiorari. If cases that have been sum-
marily decided by the Supreme Court are subject to intuitive guesses as
to what the Court really meant, there is a likelihood that the lower
courts' interpretation will tend to be result oriented.
Although it is interesting to speculate as to the factors motivating
the court's decision, the procedural effect of a summary affirmance has
never been doubted. In Barton v. Sentner,'3 where the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed an appeal on the authority of United States v. Wit-
kovich, 3 2 two dissenting justices stated: "The court, by summary af-
firmance on this appeal, without argument, enlarges its holding in Wit-
kovich . ,,1"" Thus, the Barton dissenters took cognizance of the
fact that "affirmance of an appeal is a decision by the Supreme Court
having precedential value, not a mere refusal to review that allows the
lower court's decision to stand.' 34
The meaning of both a summary affirmance and a summary dis-
missal on the merits before argument has been characterized by legal
writers as follows:
When the Court feels that the decision below is correct and that
no substantial question on the merits has been raised, it will af-
firm an appeal from a federal court, but will dismiss an appeal
from a state court "for want of a substantial federal question."
Only history would seem to justify this distinction; it would appear
more sensible to affirm appeals from both state and federal courts
when the reason for the summary disposition is that the decision
below is correct. 135
Clearly, then, the basic reason behind a summary affirmance is no
more mysterious than the procedural effect to be accorded the affirm-
ance. That is, a summary affirmance is the antithesis of uncertainty;
the Court is simply saying that argument on the matter is unnecessary
because the lower court's decision is not open to serious dispute.135a
130. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 111, at 8.
131. 353 U.S. 963 (1957).
132. 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
133. 353 U.S. 963 (1957).
134. STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 127, at 230-31.
135. Id. at 233.
135a. In Spano v. Board of Education, 40 U.S.L.W. 2475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Jan. 21,
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Distinguishing Mclnnis
Perhaps sensing some of the ambiguities inherent in its argu-
ment against the court of appeal's view of Mclnnis, the California
Supreme Court hastened to add that it believed Mclnnis could be dis-
tinguished,'136 and discussed what it considered to be the substantive
reasons why Mclnnis need not be followed. The Serrano court's con-
tention that the plaintiffs in Mclnnis were seeking "significantly differ-
ent" relief, and that the nonjusticiability of the "educational needs" con-
cept was seen as the controlling ground for the holding in Mclnnis has
previously been noted.:137  One troublesome aspect of the Serrano opin-
ion is that so little space was devoted by the court in explaining how
the substantive constitutional issues decided by the Mclnnis court could
be distinguished from the issues raised in Serrano.3 8  Analysis of pre-
cisely what the Mclnnis court held raises certain unanswered questions
about the Serrano court's version of the case.
At the outset in Mclnnis the district court held:
[N]o cause of action is stated for two principal reasons: (1) the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require that public school ex-
penditures be made only on the basis of pupil's educational needs,
and (2) the lack of judicially manageable standards makes this
controversy nonjusticiable. After explaining the structure of the
existing Illinois legislation, this opinion will discuss these two con-
clusions in detail.'39
The underlying basis for the district court's holding is not included
in the Serrano court's abbreviated discussion of the case.
The district court held that the "educational needs" standard was
nonjusticiable; however, the court also based its holding on a determi-
nation of the constitutional issues before it. Thus, the court inter-
preted the vague demand that public school funds be expended accord-
ing to the educational needs of the students and stated:
1972), the court emphatically rejected the Serrano court's characterization of the effect
of Mclnnis. With reference to the view expressed in Serrano that a per curiam opinion
is akin to granting or denying certiorari, the Spano court stated that "to accept such
a view is to demean the U.S. Supreme Court." The court disapproved of the effort in
Serrano "to extract revelatory arcane insights from the bare bones of [summary] af-
firmances." Furthermore, the Spano opinion emphasized that it was not within the
competence of a state court to guess at the content of the Supreme Court's unexpressed
views: "mhe U.S. Supreme Court is quite capable of expounding its views when so
inclined; also, that learned court does not require pronouncements from intermediary
surrogates."
136. 5 Cal. 3d at 617, 487 P.2d at 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
137. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
138. The California court's efforts in this area consisted of two sentences in
which it stressed the "significantly different" relief that the Serrano plaintiffs sought.
5 Cal. 3d at 617, 487 P.2d at 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
139. 293 F. Supp. at 329 (emphasis added).
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[T]he students' goal is presumably a judicial pronouncement that
each pupil is entitled to a minimum level of educational expen-
ditures, which would be significantly higher than the existing [state
supported minimum expenditures]. 140
The district court fully considered the question of the constitu-
tionality of the existing Illinois system of public school financing,''
and concluded:
The present Illinois scheme for financing public education reflects
a rational policy . . . . Unequal educational expenditures per
student, based upon the variable property values and tax rates of
local school districts, do not amount to an invidious discrimina-
tion. Moreover, the statutes which permit these unequal expendi-
tures on a district to district basis are neither arbitrary nor un-
reasonable.
There is no Constitutional requirement that public school ex-
penditures be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs
without regard to the financial strength of local school districts. 142
This statement seems to clearly outline the basic syllogism behind the
court's holding: (1) the Illinois system of public school financing is
"neither arbitrary nor unreasonable"; (2) the disparaties in per pupil
expenditures resulting from the system "do not amount to an invidious
discrimination"; therefore the court felt justified in concluding that (3)
there was no constitutional requirement that public school expenditures
be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs.
If the foregoing analysis of the court's reasoning in Mclnnis is
correct, it would appear that the district court ruled on the same funda-
mental issues faced by the Serrano court, i.e., the constitutionality of the
legislative financing plan, and the ruling was then applied to the specific
contention of the plaintiffs that the system should be changed so as to
meet pupils' "educational needs." Thus, the summary statement that
plaintiffs in Serrano were seeking "significantly different" relief does not
adequately distinguish the two cases. In substance, the Illinois court
held that the legislative financing scheme (which was acknowledged by
the Serrano court to be substantially the same as the California sys-
tem) did not contravene the mandate of the equal protection clause.
The Serrano opinion did not adequately resolve this issue by point-
ing out that the plaintiffs in the two cases differed on the relief to be
granted if the respective financing system were held unconstitutional.
The Serrano court's version of Mclnnis would have been more per-
suasive if the California court had explained how the district court's
140. Id. at 331 n.11.
141. Id. at 332-35. It is important to note in this regard that the financing
scheme that the Mclnnis court reviewed was essentially the same type of combination
plan as that used by the State of California. Compare note 13 & accompanying text
supra, with 293 F. Supp. at 330.
142. 293 F. Supp. at 336.
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ruling on the constitutionality of the statutory system in question could
be reconciled with, or differentiated from, the basic constitutional issues
raised by the plaintiffs in Serrano.143
Another problem with the Serrano court's interpretation of Mc-
Innis is the failure to explain more fully the reasons for characterizing
the Mclnnis court's ruling on the constitutional issue as dictum.1 44 The
two grounds given by the district court in Mclnnis for its holding have
already been mentioned. 145  It is difficult to label either of the two
grounds as dictum in view of the settled California rule that:
[W]here two independent reasons are given for a decision, neither
one is to be considered mere dictum, since there is no more reason
for calling one ground the real basis of the decision than the
other. The ruling on both grounds is the judgment of the court
and each is [of] equal validity. 46
The Serrano court apparently disagreed with this principle when it read
Mclnnis. There is no statement in the Mclnnis decision to indicate that
the district court regarded "nonjusticiability" as the major reason for
its holding, and that the constitutional issue was deemed minor.147 The
Serrano court's characterization of the constitutional issues discussed
in Mclnnis as "dictum" should have been fully explained by the court.
The California Supreme Court's view as to the precedential effect
of Mclnnis on the Serrano case is clouded by ambiguities and uncer-
tainties. The Serrano court cited some secondary authority to the
effect that a summary affirmance by the United States Supreme Court
is not necessarily a decision on the merits.'48 But the California court
did not indicate the guidelines to be used by a lower court in deter-
143. The possibility remains that the case might reach the California Supreme
Court again after a trial on the merits. In that event, the court might choose to
elaborate on its position with regard to the McInnis case.
144. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
145. See note 139 & accompanying text supra.
146. Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 644, 650,
20 P.2d 940, 942, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 659 (1933); accord, Gilgert v. Stockton Port
Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 384, 389, 60 P.2d 847, 849 (1936); Porter v. Cirod Inc., 242 Cal.
App. 2d 761, 764, 51 Cal. Rptr. 784, 787 (1966).
The rule laid down in the Bank of Italy case appears to be clearly violated by
the Serrano decision. Despite the unequivocal statement by the district court in
Mclnnis that it was basing its decision on two separate grounds, the Serrano court
determined to label one ground the "true" basis for the Mclnnis decision and the
other as "pure dictum." This type of selective approach was thoroughly criticized by
the court in the Bank of Italy case, yet the court apparently overrode its own criticism
and utilized this approach in the Serrano case without even a passing reference to the
prior case.
147. Actually, more emphasis in the Mclnnis decision was placed on the equal
protection issue, see 293 F. Supp. at 331-35, than on the lack of judicially manageable
standards, see id. at 335-36.
148. See notes 128-29 & accompanying text supra.
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mining when a summary affirmance was to be treated as a decision on
the merits and when it was to be viewed as something else. The court
in Serrano also left some unanswered questions when it argued that,
in any event, Mclnnis could be distinguished from the litigation before
the California court on the grounds that the Illinois plaintiffs were
seeking significantly different relief. Assuming that this contention
was correct, the Serrano court still did not explain away the fact that
the Illinois court held that a legislative financing scheme, substan-
tially the same as the California system, did not violate the equal pro-
tection clause.' 49 Furthermore, the Serrano opinion's characterization
of the Mclnnis court's ruling on the constitutional issue as dictum did
not clarify matters, since this argument flatly contradicted previous de-
cisions of the California Supreme Court without attempting to refute
the logic of those earlier cases. 15° In short, the Serrano court did not
clearly and effectively refute the California Court of Appeal's conclu-
sion that the Mclnnis holding was a binding precedent in the Serrano
litigation.
Is the "Strict Scrutiny" Test Applicable?
The district court in Mclnnis was confronted with an equal pro-
tection attack upon a school financing system that was comparable to
California's,' 5 ' and the court explained the proper equal protection
standard to be used in testing the constitutionality of the statutory sys-
tem as follows:
The Fourteenth Amendment permits the states a wide scope of
discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the state's objective.' 52
The district court concluded that the existing Illinois legislation met the
constitutional test because it was "neither arbitrary nor [did] it con-
stitute an invidious discrimination."' 53  Rather, the court felt that the
legislature had made a reasonable decision to allow local school districts
to determine their own tax burden for educational purposes.' 5 4
The Serrano court, on the other hand, chose not to apply this same
"rational relationship" test to the similar California legislation. In-
149. See note 142 & accompanying text supra.
150. See notes 144-46 & accompanying text supra.
151. In Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d at 615, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
623, the court conceded the similarity between the Illinois and California systems.
152. 293 F. Supp. at 332, quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 333. As the court put it, "[tihe state legislature's decision to allow
local choice and experimentation is reasonable ....
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stead, as has been previously pointed out, the court applied the "strict
scrutiny" equal protection test.' 55 Why the court chose not to apply
the "rational relationship" test is not explained. One is tempted to
speculate that the court was tacitly indicating that the California legis-
lation would have been constitutional had the less stringent test used
in Mclnnis been employed. In any event, the Serrano opinion relied
exclusively upon the applicability of the "strict scrutiny" test to the leg-
islation in question. Therefore, the decision must stand or fall on the
persuasiveness of the court's argument that the "strict scrutiny" test is
the proper one.
Wealth as a Suspect Classification
The court in Serrano took care to indicate that legislation which
classifies on the basis of wealth has often been critically scrutinized by
the Supreme Court. 5 6 In addition, the court stressed that, in its opin-
ion, the California public school financing system discriminated on the
basis of the wealth of a school district and its residents. 15 7  Without
questioning the validity of these assertions by the court, it should be
pointed out that the Serrano court completely failed to take into account
the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Dandridge v. Williams.158
The decision in Dandridge has been noted as a significant departure
from the earlier approach taken by the Supreme Court with regard to the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 59
In Dandridge the court was confronted with a challenge to the con-
stitutionality of an administrative regulation which the State of Maryland
promulgated in connection with its participation in the federal aid to
families with dependent children program. 60 The Maryland regula-
tion imposed a maximum limit on the total amount of aid which any
one family could receive. The appellants in Dandridge, who had large
families with standards of need that exceeded the maximum of aid
which they received under the regulation, brought suit in the United
States District Court for Maryland alleging that the regulation violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6'
Although the trial court in Dandridge found the maximum aid
regulation unconstitutional,' 62 the Supreme Court reversed the lower
155. See text accompanying notes 58 & 59 supra.
156. See note 72 & accompanying text supra.
157. See notes 60-76 & accompanying text supra.
158. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
159. 36 Mo. L. REv. 117, 124 (1971); see 9 DUQUESNE L. RE. 271, 279 (1971);
The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HAv. L. Rv. 1, 62, 64 (1970).
160. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 44A (1969 Supp.).
161. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968).
162. Id. at 458-59.
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court's ruling on a direct appeal. The opinion by Justice Stewart con-
cluded that because the regulation was of a "social and economic na-
ture" it could be reviewed only under the rational relationship equal
protection test.' 63  Quoting from McGowan v. Maryland,14 the court
indicated that "a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." ' 1 5 Thus, Jus-
tice Stewart indicated that the Maryland regulation was constitutional
in view of the fact that there were legitimate state interests which it
might conceivably further. 166
The opinion in Dandridge expressed the view that the strict scru-
tiny equal protection test should only be applied when classifications are
"infected with a racially discriminatory purpose or effect,"'6 7 or they
impinge upon a "constitutionally protected freedom."' 68 The Dand-
ridge court simply did not view the case before it as involving what it
considered to be a "constitutionally protected freedom," because, as the
court put it: "[H]ere we deal with state regulation in the social and
economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
. . ,"69 The equal protection standard that emerges from this line
of reasoning has been summarized as follows:
[Tjhe court [in Dandridge] indicates that all classifications, unless
racial or involving freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it.1 70
The standard of review set forth in Dandridge certainly does not
appear to support the view expressed in Serrano that the strict scrutiny
test was applicable to the California school financing system. The Ser-
rano opinion did not predicate its constitutional holding on the ground
that the financing system was racially discriminatory, but rather, the
court held that the system was unconstitutional because it resulted in a
classification based on wealth.' 7 ' Furthermore, there was no indica-
tion in the Serrano holding that the case involved "freedoms guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights." In light of these apparent contradictions, the
Serrano court's constitutional holding is weakened by its failure to even
discuss the Dandridge decision.
Even if one ignores the Dandridge case the question naturally
arises as to what compulsory connection the court saw between the
163. 397 U.S. at 485.
164. 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
165. 397 U.S. at 485.
166. Id. at 486.
167. Id. at 485 n.17.
168. Id. at 484 n.16.
169. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
170. 36 Mo. L. REV. 117, 125 (1971).
171. See notes 75-76 & accompanying text supra.
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prior factual contexts in which the strict scrutiny approach had been
used and the fact situation under consideration in Serrano. The court
cited Griffin v. Illinois17 2 and noted that the Supreme Court held in that
case that Illinois was obligated to provide a free transcript on appeal to
a poor defendant.1 73  Also mentioned by the court was Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections'74 which involved invalidation of a poll tax on
the basis that it would deter indigents from voting.175  Other similar
cases were also mentioned by the court. 7 6 Of course, whether these
cases lent credence to the position taken by the court-that wealth was
a suspect classification-is open to question, and scholars have dis-
puted whether the decisions of the Supreme Court in these cases were
premised on the wealth classifications or only on the basis that the fun-
damental interests in fair criminal procedure and voting were in-
volved. 177  Furthermore, even if one assumes Harper and Griffin were
decided on wealth classification grounds, this would not necessarily
mean that they supported the court's equal protection argument in Ser-
rano. At least one commentator, in analyzing these particular cases,
stated, "Griffin, Harper, and similar cases do not seem to hold that all
classifications . . . that have a differential impact on persons of dif-
ferent wealth are suspect per se absent an adverse effect on 'fundamental
interests'."' 78  In other words, if this analysis may be accepted, cases
such as Griffin and Harper would be relevant in the context of Ser-
rano only insofar as the court has succeeded in establishing that educa-
tion is a fundamental interest.
Education as a Fundamental Interest
The court's attempt to establish education among those interests
deemed to be fundamental by the Supreme Court has already been out-
lined.179  The court's efforts in this area consisted mainly of: (1) cit-
ing cases that were admittedly not directly in point in order to estab-
172. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
173. 5 Cal. 3d at 602, 487 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
174. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
175. 5 Cal. 3d at 602, 487 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
176. E.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963).
177. Michelman, Forward to The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HA. L.
REv. 7, 20-27 (1969); Brest, Book Review, 23 STAN. L. REv. 591, 604 (1971). Pro-
fessor Brest, a member of the Stanford Law School faculty, was reviewing J. CooNs,
W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIvATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970). His
criticisms are of particular interest because the book he was reviewing made essen-
tially the same equal protection argument that one finds in the Serrano opinion.
178. Brest, supra note 177, at 604.
179. See text accompanying notes 77-91 supra.
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lish the importance of education in our society; (2) attempting to de-
velop analogies between education and other interests already estab-
lished as fundamental by prior decisions; and (3) attempting to dif-
ferentiate education from other interests, less deserving of judicial pro-
tection. The first line of argument need not be discussed in detail for
no one would seriously dispute the idea that education is vital to so-
ciety. The second and third contentions, however, merit attention.
A careful analysis of the court's holding that education is a funda-
mental interest reveals that it relied on a number of undocumented asser-
tions. These same assertions had been promulgated in support of the
constitutional argument that education is a fundamental interest in a
recent law review article,1 80 and in a subsequent book by the same au-
thors, Private Wealth and Public Education."'
The Serrano court relied heavily on the above mentioned law re-
view article as authority for some of its assertions; however, the specific
manner in which the authority was utilized by the court can be faulted
because: (1) in at least one instance the court selectively quoted from
the article so as to sacrifice some of the objectivity of the original
work;' 82 and (2) the court indulged in an apparent "bootstrap" op-
eration when it supported some of its points by citing to the article
which in turn contained basic factual assumptions which were unsub-
stantiated by any empirical data.18'
The Serrano opinion also contained justifications for labeling edu-
cation as a fundamental interest which parallel those employed in Pri-
vate Wealth and Public Education although they were not directly
attributable to that work.184  In this regard, the review of the book by
Professor Brest of the Stanford Law School faculty in which the lack of
empirical data to support the authors' conclusions is criticized, is of par-
ticular interest. Many of the criticisms raised by Brest as to the va-
lidity of the conclusions reached by the book's authors might also be
leveled against parts of the holding in Serrano.'
180. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Consti-
tutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305 (1969).
181. J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION (1970).
182. See notes 193-95 & accompanying text infra.
183. See notes 196-98 & accompanying text in fra.
184. Compare 5 Cal. 3d at 607-10, 487 P.2d at 1257-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617-19,
with PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 181, at 363-72, 417.
185. See notes 188-92 & accompanying text infra for the use of such an approach
in this Note's analysis. Some of Brest's criticisms focus on the author's argument
that education should be admitted "to the equal protection clause's 'inner circle' of
fundamental interests." Biest, supra note 177, at 604. The review points out
weaknesses in the following areas: (1) the authors' conclusion that the right to
education is comparable in importance to society's interest in fair criminal law pro-
cedures, (2) the contention that education is at least as important as voting rights
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A critical review of the apparent weaknesses in the court's effort
to establish education as a fundamental interest necessitates considera-
tion of certain of the analogies used to support its own position. The
Serrano court compared the right to an education with the rights of
defendants in criminal cases, an interest which has already been recog-
nized as fundamental.' In comparison to the rights of defendants in
criminal cases, education has, said the court, "far greater social signifi-
cance than a free transcript or a court-appointed lawyer.' 1 87  Further-
more, the court indicated that education affects more people in more
ways than the criminal law.' 88 However, the court failed to take note of
certain crucial aspects of criminal procedure cases which would not ap-
pear to be present in cases alleging a fundamental right to education.
As Professor Brest has stated:
[In compulsory education] [tihe critical aspects of the criminal
process are absent: the child has committed no offense, no child
is singled out or stigmatized, and there is no purpose to subject the
pupil to unpleasant treatment. . . . There is simply no element
of the adverseness that calls forth the special duty of 'fair
play."18 9
These inherent differences from a criminal law situation are obviously
differences in kind rather than degree and could be said to dictate
greater judicial scrutiny than could be warranted in an attack upon
statutes dealing with education.
The court also drew an analogy between education and voting,
explaining that both rights are essential to an effective democracy. 9 '
"At a minimum," said the court, "education makes more meaningful
the casting of a ballot [and] it is likely to provide the understanding of,
and the interest in, public issues . . .... "' The court did not elabo-
rate further on the subject, evidently considering its assumptions to be
self-evident. Professor Brest criticizes the assumption that there is a
necessary correlation between effective voting and education:
[I]t is not unreasonable (or at least not unusual) to assume some
sort of positive relationship between the money spent on a person's
education and his political involvement, political influence, and
perhaps even the quality of his political judgments. But it is not
self-evident that increased expenditures above a certain, possibly
since the quality of the electorate's decisions are determined by the educational sys-
tem, and (3) the limiting argument that education is sufficiently unique so that
cases involving other public services need not be given the same special treatment.
Id. at 605-09.
186. See note 80 & accompanying text supra.
187. 5 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
188. Id.
189. Brest, supra note 177, at 605-06.
190. 5 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
191. Id. at 608, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
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quite modest, level will result in an increase of whatever educa-
tional output . . . deem[ed] relevant to participation in the
political process. 19
2
In the absence of empirical data, it would seem that the court's asser-
tion that there is an interrelationship between the amount of money
spent for education and the quality of the electorate's judgments is
purely speculative.
Certain difficulties also arise in connection with the court's efforts
to establish the pre-eminent position of education in our society on com-
parative grounds. Initially, the court quoted the following statement
from a law review article: 193 "Not every person finds it necessary to
call upon the fire department or even the police in an entire lifetime.
. . . Every person, however, benefits from education . ... "19 The
opinion neglected, however, to include the caveat by the author of the
article, in which it was conceded that certain public services, such as
police protection, can be of great importance merely because they are
available, even if they are never utilized.' 95 In other words, police
protection fulfills the important public function of crime deterrence
simply by being visible and available. More fundamentally the court's
effort to distinguish the beneficial effect of education from that of po-
lice and fire protection proves little with regard to the relative impor-
tance of education. The educational process obviously benefits so-
ciety in a different way than other municipal services, but that fact does
not establish that its fundamental importance to the general populace is
any greater than that of the other services. If a community were forced
to hold a plebiscite in which the voters had to choose between the
elimination of their schools, fire department, or police protection, would
the knowledge that more people have occasion to come in contact with
the schools assist them in making a confident decision?
The court also offered the following contrast between education
and other public services: "While police and fire protection, garbage
collection and street lights are essentially neutral in their effect on the
individual psyche, public education actively attempts to shape a child's
personal development .... ."19' The court's authority for this state-
ment was the same law review article, in which the authors did not
refer to any independent empirical studies in support of their original
assertions. 9 7 This basic lack of authority naturally raises the ques-
tion of whether or not the propositions the court sets forth at this point
192. Brest, supra note 177, at 606.
193. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 180, at 388.
194. 5 Cal. 3d at 609, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
195. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 180, at 388 n.231.
196. 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
197. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 180, at 389.
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are really as self-evident as asserted by the court. Can it be assumed
without further investigation that poor police protection and inadequate
garbage collection have no effect on the "child's personal development"?
In summary, the decision in Serrano which establishes a pre-
eminent position of the right to education is not convincing. The effort
to differentiate public education from other vital public services was
based on presumptions, not factual studies.198 The attempt to analo-
gize education and the procedural rights of criminal defendants ignored
important qualitative differences between the two.199 Also, the anal-
ogy drawn between education and voting rights appears to have rested
upon an unfounded assumption.200 The court does not appear to have
clearly and unequivocally established education as one of the interests
which should be considered fundamental for equal protection purposes.
In view of the apparent weaknesses in the distinctions drawn by
the court, one is left to speculate as to why the court attempted to dif-
ferentiate education from other essential government services in the
first place. Some writers have suggested that all essential public serv-
ices which are primarily funded by local property taxes should be re-
examined in the light of the "strict scrutiny" approach to the equal
protection clause.20 ' None of these writers makes any effort to dif-
ferentiate education from other governmental services. Evidently these
authors did not consider that the more pedestrian services were any less
essential, in the practical sense of the term, than education. A better
approach, both from the point of view of consistency and social policy,
is to say that the equal protection clause demands a rough parity in the
distribution of all vital public services.
The defendants in Serrano conceded that if the financing system
for the public schools was constitutionally unsound, the same could
also be said of other governmental services which are financed in much
the same way.20 2 The court did not respond to this particular con-
tention by the defendants, but chose instead to leave the question un-
answered. The court indicated that irrespective of any arguments
about other services, it was satisfied that the right to education was a
fundamental interest.208 This stance appears to be a bit inconsistent
198. See notes 193-97 & accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 186-89 & accompanying text supra.
200. See notes 190-92 & accompanying text supra.
201. E.g., Abascal, Municipal Services and Equal Protection: Variations on a
Theme by Griffin v. Illinois, 20 HASTINGS LJ. 1367, 1386-87 (1969); Fessler & Haar,
Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal Services in the Interstices of Pro-
cedure, 6 HARV. Crv. RiGrHTs-Crv. Lm. L. Rnv. 441, 463 (1971); Note, Equal Protec-
tion: The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 37 BROoKLYN L. REV. 568, 569 n.7
(1971).
202. 5 Cal. 3d at 613-14, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
203. Id. at 614, 487 P.2d at 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622-23.
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with the court's earlier effort to demonstrate what it considered to be
clear-cut differences between education and other public services.204
Perhaps the Serrano court felt constrained to emphasize the
unique qualities of education because it thought that an effort to ele-
vate all municipal services to the status of "fundamental interest" would
leave its decision more vulnerable to attack. The difficulties faced by
the court inherent in its effort to justify active and critical review of a
statute affecting the right to education may have been great enough
without going further out on a limb. One writer characterized the
problem thusly:
Education, [in contrast to interests already recognized as funda-
mental] presents a more difficult task for justification of active
review. . . . Unlike voting and fair criminal procedure, educa-
tion is not an interest which has long been recognized to be of pre-
eminent importance.2 05
Whatever the motivation for the Serrano court's attempt to dis-
tinguish education from other vital public services, the opinion is not
persuasive on this matter from the point of view of both logic and pub-
lic policy. Thus, the court appears to have caught itself in its own trap
by failing to establish education as deserving of greater judicial con-
sideration than other public services, yet at the same time refusing
to extend that special consideration to the other services. 0 6
Is Judicial Action the Appropriate Solution?
Propriety of Judicial Activism
The district court in Mclnnis made it clear that it did not think
the solution to the problem of providing equal educational opportunity
should be achieved through litigation. No attempt to minimize the in-
equalities of the existing public school financing system was made; how-
ever, the court indicated that the problem of how best to allocate the
state's financial resources was more a legislative than a judicial prob-
lem. 0 7  Furthermore, the court felt that the problems involved were
beyond judicial cognizance because "the courts simply cannot pro-
vide the empirical research and consultation necessary for intelligent
educational planning. '20 8 Therefore, the court concluded, "If the leg-
islatures cannot solve these problems surely the deep cutting edge of
constitutional precepts is not the answer. "209
204. See text accompanying notes 193-97 supra.
205. Developments-Equal Protection, supra note 42, at 1129 (1969); accord,
Brest, supra note 177, at 606.
206. See text accompanying notes 201-204 supra.
207. 293 F. Supp. at 331-32.
208. Id. at 336.
209. Id., n.38; see Developments-Equal Protection, supra note 42, at 1129.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
Obviously the Serrano court felt that constitutional precepts did
provide a proper basis for deciding the same issue that confronted the
district court in Mclnnis. Which court was right? Perhaps the answer
can be found by examining some of the underlying problems involved
in the school financing controversy to determine if the Serrano deci-
sion effectively dealt with them.
Initially, it is worth noting that educators are still embroiled in a
controversy as to whether or not a given amount of money spent in a
ghetto school will do as much good as the same amount expended in a
suburban school. The central finding of a leading study, the Coleman
Report,2 10 indicates that it will not.
It appears that variations in the facilities and curriculums of the
schools account for relatively little variation in pupil achieve-
ment insofar as this is measured by standard tests . . .. [A]
pupil's achievement is strongly related to the educational back-
grounds and aspirations of the other students in the school.2 11
The Serrano opinion acknowledged this "controversy among educa-
tors" in a footnote; 212 however, the court found it unnecessary to con-
sider any factual controversy in view of the fact that plaintiffs' com-
plaint had alleged that the amount of educational expenditure affected
the quality of education, and "for purposes of testing the sufficiency of
a complaint against a general demurrer, we must take its allegations to
be true. ' 213  As the Serrano court indicated, the procedural treatment
to be accorded plaintiffs' allegations on demurrer was cut and dried;
however, the procedural situation in Serrano does not change the exist-
ing fact that there is active disagreement as to whether there is any re-
lationship between educational achievement and the amount of money
spent per pupil. In future litigation, this substantive argument could
be decided adversely by a court less inclined to believe that judicial
activism is the proper means of affecting reforms in school financing.
Another problem inherent in the concept of equal expenditures for
education is that too much emphasis might be placed on educational
equality at the expense of educational quality. Some writers have sug-
gested that a demand for equal expenditures may result in an "adverse
leveling effect"21 4 in that a state would simply reduce all the school sys-
tems within the state to the lowest common denominator. 215  This de-
210. U.S. OFmc OF EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966)
[hereinafter cited as COLEMAN]. See Coon, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 180, at 310
n. 16.
211. COLEMAN, supra note 210, at 22.
212. 5 Cal. 3d at 601 n.16, 487 P.2d at 1253 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n.16.
213. Id.
214. Kirp, Book Review, 78 YALE L.J. 908, 911 (1969).
215. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Juris-
prudence Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 583, 590-91 (1968).
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velopment would in turn damage the rich school districts that attempted
to stimulate excellence in their school systems.216 The Serrano court
did not deal with this "reverse discrimination" contention, but the pos-
sibility that it might be raised in future litigation should not be ignored.
If found persuasive, such an argument could make a court lean in the
direction of those who feel that judicial action is not the appropriate
means of dealing with such problems.
The pessimistic view that requiring equal expenditures for edu-
cation may have an adverse impact on the quality of education overall
has been countered by at least one knowledgeable observer with the
assertion that such dire results are unlikely in the Serrano situation in
view of California's long-standing commitment to education. 217 In ad-
dition, it has been argued that rich "public" schools are in effect pri-
vate schools for the chosen few that live in the right districts, and that
nothing would really be lost if these "rich" individuals avoided the use
of "public" schools and sent their children to private schools.2 18
The Problem of Implementation
The practical problem of implementing the decision in Serrano is
another point which should not be overlooked when discussing the ap-
propriateness of judicial action in this area. If the case is remanded
and the defendants lose, they will be ordered, as the Serrano opinion
indicated, "to reallocate school funds in order to remedy [the] invalid-
ity" of the present financing system.219 Should the state authorities
fail to respond within a reasonable time, the trial court would retain
jurisdiction of the action in order to rebuild the system. 22 0  The court
did not, however, attempt to dictate precisely how these goals are to
be accomplished. Presumably the court was relying on the state legis-
lature to take its cue and restructure the statutory framework of the
system.
Will the California legislature respond to the court's ruling, and if
so, will the legislative response satisfy the court's requirements? As-
suming the legislature fails to take the necessary steps, will the trial
court be able to effectively supervise a restructuring of the system?
These questions go to the ultimate success or failure of the Serrano de-
cision. More fundamentally, they raise doubts as to the practicability
of achieving the kind of equitable relief that the plaintiffs sought in
216. Id.
217. Interview with Sidney M. Wolinsky, attorney for plaintiffs in Serrano, in
San Francisco, Sept. 27, 1971.
218. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 180, at 419.




Serrano.22' The propriety of the court's attempt to exercise its equity
powers is open to question, and the basic inquiry remains as to whether
the issues presented in Serrano are beyond judicial cognizance.
Professor Kurland has stated that judicial action is inappropriate
in this area and that a court attempting to effectuate a decision based
on the equal protection argument used in Serrano would be unsuccess-
fUl. 2 2 2 He contends that such a decision would lack certain elements
that are necessary to any important equal protection case which has an
effective impact on society as a whole. These "ingredients for suc-
cess," gleaned from an analysis of earlier decisions by Professor Kur-
land, follow:
The first requirement is that the constitutional standard be a sim-
ple one. The second is that the judiciary have adequate control
over the means of effectuating enforcement. The third is that
the public acquiesce .... 223
Kurland feels that the first requirement would be met in a school
financing case if a guide of equal expenditures per pupil were em-
ployed.224 However, he also indicates that such a simple standard would
be undesirable because it would only reduce, rather than eliminate, ex-
isting inequities. 225  Any standard formulated should, he says, "afford
a basis for the inundation of the worst schools with the best resources
that society can marshal. 226
The Serrano decision did not impose the rigid standard of equal-
ity which Kurland's article criticizes, and instead sought the more amor-
phous goal of eliminating "substantial disparities" in the revenue avail-
able to different school districts.227  Thus the court did not preclude
the expenditure of greater sums of money where it is rationally justi-
fied. On the other hand, the court abandoned whatever advantage
there may have been in having a simple constitutional formula such as
the "one man, one vote" formula used in Baker v. Carr.22 s
The second requirement discussed by Kurland, that the judiciary
have adequate control over the means of effectuating enforcement, also
presents problems in the Serrano holding. Professor Kurland summar-
izes the difficulty of a court trying to reform a school financing system
as follows:
The judiciary is extremely efficient at wiping a statute off the
books. It is quite good at rewriting an existing statute so as to
221. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
222. Kurland, supra note 215, at 592-98.
223. id. at 592.
224. Id. at 596.
225. Id. at 597.
226. Id.
227. 5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
228. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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frame a rule that it would have legislated had it been a legisla-
ture. But it is not very strong on creating legislation ab initio.
229
Hopefully, the Serrano court has avoided this dilemma by jolting the
California legislature into action. Of course, the success of Serrano un-
der this view depends entirely upon whether or not the legislators ac-
cept the role the court has fashioned for itself as a spokesman for
change.
If the legislature fails to act, and a subsequent trial on the merits
results in a holding that the present system is unconstitutional, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's efforts may have produced nothing more
than an impasse between an unconstitutional school financing system
and an unenforceable court order. Such an eventuality conjures up vi-
sions of a paralyzed state school system; however, the court has wisely
avoided this potential embarrassment by filing its modification order
which allows the present system to operate until it is replaced.230
With reference to the third "ingredient for success," public ac-
quiescence, Kurland is also pessimistic. He notes that the school de-
segregation ideal enunciated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education2 31' has yet to become a reality because of public hostility; and
he sees no reason to believe that the American public will behave in a
more enlightened manner if inequality in school financing is the is-
sue.2 32  Whether Professor Kurland's assessment of court imposed
school financing schemes is correct or not will have to await the final
outcome in Serrano.
The "Natural Law" Dilemma
One additional factor which might prompt inquiry as to the pro-
priety of judicial action in this area, is the fear that the courts will
usurp a disproportionate amount of political power. Chief Justice War-
ren E. Burger expressed this concern as follows:
Those who would look to judges . . . to innovate and reshape our
society will do well to ponder what remedy is available if the world
shaped by the judicial process is not to their liking.
I suggest that this approach be considered against the
background of our traditions and history which began with a
revolution instituted to overthrow a government that was beyond
recall by the votes of the people.233
229. Kurland, supra note 215, at 597.
230. See note 121 & accompanying text supra.
231. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
232. Kurland, supra note 215, at 598.
233. Address by Chief Justice Burger, Georgetown University, Sept. 17, 1971,
quoted in U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 4, 1971, at 19. See also Note, Dis-
crimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. Rrv. 435,
453 (1967).
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Of course these remarks by the chief justice were not directed at
any particular court or decision; however, they were no doubt aimed at
what he considered to be an unfortunate judicial trend. Interestingly
enough, his warning seems to echo the following excerpt from Justice
Black's dissent in Adamson v. California:234
This decision reasserts a constitutional theory spelled out in Twin-
ing v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, that this Court is endowed by
the Constitution with boundless power under "natural law" pe-
riodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to con-
form to the Court's conception of what at a particular time con-
stitutes "civilized decency" and "fundamental liberty and jus-
tice., 235
Although Justice Black's statement was made with reference to a due
process issue,236 his remarks regarding imaginative judicial interpre-
tation closely parallel those made by Chief Justice Burger. If the Su-
preme Court were to view Serrano in the same light as Burger and Black
viewed the concept they were criticizing in the preceding statements, the
ruling on the issues presented in Serrano would probably be contrary
to the California court's decision.
Although it would be idle to speculate as to exactly how the ju-
dicial philosophy of the Supreme Court might affect the outcome of an
appeal from the Serrano decision, one can safely say that the justices'
attitude toward the role of the judicial system in our society would be an
important factor in deciding the case. The ruling in Serrano is clearly
a bold and aggressive move by the California Supreme Court into an
area not previously considered by an appellate court to be appropriate
for judicial action. 237 If the United States Supreme Court frowns on this
instance of judicial activism, it would no doubt be hesitant to adopt the
California Supreme Court's view of the Serrano case.
Conclusions
The basic importance of Serrano v. Priest is clear. It is the first
appellate court decision to hold that a widely used method of financing
public schools violates the equal protection mandate of the Fourteenth
Amendment; this assumes, of course, that plaintiffs can prove their al-
legations. The future impact of the decision is not so clear. A number
of imponderables are encountered when one attempts to assess how the
Serrano decision might fare on appeal to the Supreme Court, or how far
it may be relied upon as precedent by other courts.
234. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
235. Id. at 69.
236. Justice Black was disturbed by the majority opinion which upheld the con-
stitutionality of a California law which permitted court and counsel to comment on
the failure of a defendant to testify, because "[i]t [did] not seem unfair .. ." 332
U.S. at 57.
237. See notes 21-22 & accompanying text supra.
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The court's characterization of the precedential effect of Mclnnis
is debatable. This is a point of no small importance since, if the Ser-
rano court's version of Mclnnis is found to be wrong, the California
court would have had no discretion to decide the Fourteenth Amend-
ment issue in the first place.23
8
The Serrano court's argument for the application of the "strict
scrutiny" equal protection test to school financing statutes may be ques-
tioned. 23 9  The right to education may be different than the right to
police and fire protection as noted by the court, but it is not so certain
that it is any more important a right. If the importance of education
is conceded, can one say that its importance is as clearly and unequivo-
cally established as that of the interests already considered fundamental
for equal protection purposes? Again it must be noted that this is a
potentially vulnerable point because the court based its entire consti-
tutional argument on the applicability of the "strict scrutiny" test.
Finally, it should be noted that distinguished writers have ad-
vanced several arguments to the effect that judicial action is neither
an appropriate nor an effective means of accomplishing educational
reforms.240 Of course, if a state such as California succeeds in effectu-
ating these reforms via the courts, the force of most of the arguments
will be gone.
To say that the Serrano decision is assailable in certain respects is
perhaps to say nothing more than that it is imperfect, as all human
endeavors must be. However, the imperfections in Serrano appear to
be substantial and may not be readily disregarded. Consequently, we
must await the final outcome of Serrano to determine whether the egali-
tarian principles embodied in the opinion by the court will ultimately
triumph.
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